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I. Introduction
In assessing whether, or in what degree, to provide an environmen-
tal good, two propositions appear to command a measure of support.
First, where a polluting source can be identified, such as a smoke-
emitting factory or a noise-emitting airport, the "polluter pays"
principle can properly be applied. Thus an excise tax might be levied
on the good or service produced by the polluting source, or an emis-
sions tax might be applied. The tax, by itself, can be expected to
induce a reduction in emissions, and the tax revenues might be used to
further reduce adverse environmental impacts or to compensate the
affected parties. Second, where source identification is not pos-
sible, or where the issue is simply one of community improvement, like
improving police services or city parks, the cost can properly be
charged to those who gain from the improvement. In this case, an
income or capitation tax or other charge might be levied on the
benefitting parties.
It is recognized that it is not always easy to apply these prin-
ciples and that ultimately the actions taken may cause inequities
among the affected parties. Perhaps more important, behavioral
changes consequent upon the provision of an environmental good and any
charges therefore may cause portions of the costs and benefits to be
-2-
shifted to third parties, with the ultimate incidence of effects dif-
fering significantly from the initial or proximate impacts.
This paper utilizes a closed-city urban spatial model (see for
example, Polinsky and Shavell, 1976, Section 4) to examine two sets of
issues arising from pollution and its abatement. First, it considers
the distributional impacts of abatement itself and of alternative
methods of financing it. Second, it develops optimal abatement out-
comes both for alternative abatement-financing regimens and from a
cost-benefit vantage point. The type of pollution considered is that
having a defined pattern across the landspace, such as power-plant or
factory emissions or noise emanating from an airport. However, the
relevance of the analysis is not limited to pollution phenomena.
Aspects of the discussion may be relevant for other public goods having
the appropriate spatial characteristics. The model allows for assess-
ment of impacts on distinct participant groups, renters and property
owners, as well as on the polluting source. Primary consideration is
given to an income tax and a commodity tax as means of financing abate-
ment, while note is taken of a property tax as an alternative.
The choice for analytical purposes of a closed over an open city
rests on two main grounds. First, in the short and medium run, all
"cities" or residential communities are, as a practical matter,
closed. Decisions to change residence or neighborhood take time, and
the period may be extended if there is uncertainty as to the per-
manence of a prompting amenity change. Moreover, movement into or out
of an area may be inhibited by the special attachments that households
often develop for place of residence or neighborhood, by occupational
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need that places a premium on a given residential location, and by
transportation arrangements that make between-city moves costly. All
such circumstances serve to limit residential adjustments in face of
modest and even perhaps appreciable amenity changes, and make the
closed city an appropriate object of attention. Second, the implica-
tions of amenity and related changes in an open city, with the utility
levels of consumers exogenously given, are rather straightforward.
The benefits and costs of such changes tend, through the migration of
consumers and factors, to be translated into rental and property value
charges, with associated benefits and burdens for property owners,
leaving consumer-renters essentially untouched. In contrast, the
effects of such changes in a closed city are less well understood.
It should be added that the intent of the paper is not to develop
general results but to illustrate possible outcomes for an interesting
class of cases.
II. The Basic Model
Let there be an island-like, elongated land mass devoted to resi-
dential dwellings. At one end is a disamenity source such as an air-
port emanating noise or a waste disposal site. The community
occupying the land mass is self-contained, being separated from other
communities by substantial transportation costs. A given number of
persons or households resides in the community. The sites they occupy
are rented, with the rental payments flowing to absentee landlords.
Because the disamenity is most intense at its source, with its effects
diminishing with distance, the amenity level rises with distance from
the source.
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We assume our population to be homogeneous in its tastes, in-
cluding sensitivity to the disamenity. We assume also that our popu-
lation has identical incomes. Let each consumer have a utility
2
function of the form,
(1) D - (M+6)LZ
and a budget constraint,
(la) P M + P L - yv ML
where M = quantity consumed (by each consumer) of a composite good
L = quantity consumed (by each consumer) of residential land
Z = index of amenity level at any location (and enjoyed by con-
sumers at that location) , in turn a function of distance
from the disamenity source
p = price of the composite good
P = price per unit of land
Li
y income of the consumer
5 = a parameter, with 6 ~
The utility function represents a compromise between what one might,
on theoretical grounds, prefer and what is mathematically tractable.
Because it allows for non-unitary income elasticities of demand, for a
non-unitary price elasticity of demand for one of the goods, and for a
non-zero cross-price elasticity for the other good, it has greater
generality in the context of this paper than would a Cobb-Douglas
function.
Substituting (la) into (1) and maximizing utility gives demand
functions for each of the two goods,
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(2) M =
y-pM 5
2P
M
(2a) ^=-3^-
L
Substituting these demand functions back into the utility function,
treating utility as a constant and solving for P gives:
Li
(3) PT -
Z(y+P
M
«)'
L 4UP
M
Note that the amenity level, Z, varies with the consumer's dis-
tance, X, from the disamenity source. With this in mind, expression
(3) may be interpreted as describing a family of bid-price contours
over the land space (Rosen, 1974, p. 38; Polinsky and Shavell, 1976, p,
122). Along each contour, differential prices serve to equalize util-
ity across locations differing in their respective amenity levels.
The contour that comes ultimately to prevail, and the utility level
associated with it, depends on the aggregate number of consumers com-
peting for the limited supply of land. Let there be N consumers, or
renters, seeking shelter in the limited land space. Then we may write
x"
(4) / D(X)wdX = N
where X = a parameter denoting distance from the disamenity source to
the terminal point of the land space or island
D = population density, or persons per acre (which varies with
the price of land and, in turn, with distance from the
source)
w = width of the land space or island, taken equal to unit
distance, e.g., one mile
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The left side of (4) sums the residents over the available land space,
This number must equal the total who bid for that space, or the popu-
lation of the area. Population density may be expressed as
(4a) D(X) = UX)
That is, density equals the reciprocal of land consumed per capita,
with both in turn dependent on distance from the disamenity source.
Substituting (3) into (2a) and the resulting expression for L(X) into
(4a) gives,
(y+P 6)Z(X)
(4b) D(X) =-
2P U
M
Now let the amenity function, Z(X), be described by the diffusion or
propogation function,
(4c) Z = j + gX
where j = the amenity level at the source of the disamenity, i.e.,
where X =
g > = a propogation coefficient indicating the increase in the
amenity level as one moves away from the source
The parameter j may be understood as j = a - c, where "a" represents
the amenity level in the absence of the disamenity and c represents
the amenity loss at the source of the disamenity, with a > c > 0.
Thus, a decline in the intensity of the disamenity at the source, as
through abatement, would serve to shift the amenity function upwards.
The left panel of Figure 1, showing contours m and ra , illustrates
such a shift.
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Substituting (4c) Into (4b) and the result, in turn, into (4)
gives
X (y+P 6)(j+gX)wdX
(4d) / ^r-fi = N2P U
M
and performing the integration yields
(y+P
M
6)(2jX+gX2 )
(4e)
4F1J =N
M
Solving for the equilibrium utility level yields
(y+P S)(2jX+gX2 )
(4f) U = 4P N
M
Equation (4f) expresses the equilibrium utility level and substituting
it into (3) gives the equilibrium rent contour:
(y+PM «)(J+gX)N
(5) P =
L UjX+gX2 )
This contour is linear in X and rises over the land space as
distance from the disamenity source increases. Such a contour is
illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1 by the curves designated
n and n . The differential prices displayed along the contour reflect
differential land quality as determined by the disamenity. Land more
distant from the source enjoys a higher amenity level and thus commands
higher rents.
III. Costless Abatement
Consider the case in which partial abatement occurs by means that
reduce the intensity of the disamenity at the source. The effect will
-8-
be an increase in the parameter j in the amenity function and a
resultant upward shift in the function, as from the curve m to the
curve m_ in the left panel of Figure 1. Suppose further, as a
reference case, that the abatement is costless or, if not, is financed
by an external governmental source. How will the benefits of this
abatement be distributed?
The shift in the amenity function will prompt an adjustment in the
rent contour. In the present instance, the contour will rotate clock-
wise, with the post-abatement contour intersecting the pre-abatement
contour from above. Rents for properties to the left of the inter-
section thus rise, while those to the right of the intersection
3
decline. In the right panel of Figure 1, the curves n, anc*
n_ represent respectively the pre-and post-abatement contours. An
intuitive explanation for this outcome is that properties close to the
source have become relatively more attractive with abatement, while
more distant properties have lost some of the relative advantages they
previously enjoyed (see Polinsky and Shavell, 1975, p. 103, Frankel,
1985).
What are the welfare implications of this case for renters and
property owners? Consider a household at location X , the intersec-
9
tion of the two rent contours. The rent at this location does not
change with abatement, and the consumer experiences a simple utility
increase from the reduction in the disamenity. Since price differen-
ces are utility-equalizing, all other households along the contour n
enjoy the same level of utility as the household at X Q and with abate-
ment experience the same net increase in utility as it does. For
-9-
these other households, the net utility gain is a combination of abate-
ment benefits and price changes. Households to the left of the inter-
section enjoy relatively large (subjective) abatement benefits that
are partially offset by price increases, while households to the right
of the intersection experience smaller (subjective) abatement benefits
4
that are augmented by price reductions. For the landlord or property
owners, as distinct from the renter, the effects of abatement are
mixed. Properties to the left of X Q , whose rents rise, rise in value8
while those to the right of X fall in value. Note, however, that the
6
aggregate of rents paid by renters and received by property owners is
the same after abatement as before. This is so because the demand for
land by each consumer, as expressed in (2a), exhibits unitary elastic-
ity. While abatement thus leaves property owners as a group as well
off as before, it causes a redistribution of income and wealth among
.
5
them.
Two things are worth stressing about these distribution effects.
First, it is not possible through abatement to bring differential
benefits to renters. No matter what abatement scheme might be
adopted—for example one to give greater physical relief to those
close to the disamenity source than to those more remotely situated
—
land prices will respond in a way that causes all households to bene-
fit equally. Second, the consequences for property owners are not
consistent with any plausible distributional ethic. One might reason-
ably want or expect this group to share in, or perhaps be the exclu-
sive recipients of, abatement benefits. But the results in the
present case do not fulfill any such expectation.
-10-
IV. Financing Abatement
If abatement is not costless to the community, but instead must be
financed by it, the net benefits realized by renters and property
owners, and the distribution of benefits between the two groups, will
change, with the outcome dependent on the type of financing employed.
The discussion that immediately follows considers the impacts of the
major financing alternatives. The scenario we envisage is one in
which the imposition of a tax does not cause a leakage of income from
the community and a consequent change in pre-tax income. This outcome
may be assured in various ways. But let us simply suppose that what-
ever the type of tax applied, the proceeds are used within the com-
munity, as may be needed, to offset any decline in after-tax outlays
and reemploy, say in the supply of abatement services, resources that
might otherwise be displaced. Thus income or sales tax revenues might
be used to reallocate resources from the composite good, whose produc-
tion might be thought of as the polluting source, to the supply of
abatement services.
With the foregoing caveat in mind, each of the financing alter-
natives may be incorporated into the model described above. With
identical incomes for consumers, the levy of an income tax becomes a
capitation tax and can be represented as a simple deduction from
before-tax income. Accordingly, in the several expressions previously
presented, the parameter y may be replaced by (y-A), where A is the
amount of the capitation tax. An excise tax on the composite good may
be treated as having two components, one representing the amount by
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which the price of the composite good is increased and the other
representing the amount by which, at the margin, producer's surplus is
decreased. Then we may write
(6) T = E + S
where T is the tax per unit and E and S denote respectively each of
the two above components. Note that in the case of constant marginal
costs, S = and the full amount of the tax will be passed through to
consumers in an adjustment of the price of the composite good.
It may be helpful in understanding the discussion that follows to
note also the price elasticity of demand for the composite good. From
(2),
J M
If 6=0, the special Cobb-Douglas case, n = -1 . 5 > yields the
case of relatively elastic demand, and 6 < gives the case of rela-
tively inelastic demand. It may also be helpful to point out that the
equilibrium quantity of land rented by any consumer, in contrast to
the equilibrium price paid for it, is independent of both income and
the price of the composite good. Substituting expression (5), which
gives equilibrium land price, into expression (2) showing the demand
for land, results in
2jT+ gX2
(7a) L = 2(j+-gX)N
Hence an income tax, which reduces y, or an excise tax, which raises
P
,
will not alter the quantity of land taken by a consumer.
-12-
A. The Effects of an Income Tax
In considering an income tax, let us first treat the case where
the composite good is supplied under conditions of constant marginal
cost. In the absence of any taxes, the aggregate expenditure for rent
by any consumer can be obtained by multiplying (2a) by P to get
Li
(7b) P
L
L --^-
If an income tax in amount A is levied, aggregate expenditure is
instead
(y-A) + PM 5
(7c) (PL) EL.LA <£
Although the demand curve for the composite good shifts to the left in
response to the income tax, the price of the composite good, P , is
M
unaffected by the tax under conditions of constant marginal cost, and
subtracting (7c) from (7b) yields
<?d) p
l
l - (p
l
d
a
=
f-
That is, the consumer's expenditure on rent declines by half the
amount of the tax. Since the quantity of land he consumes is unaf-
fected by the tax, it follows that this part of the tax is passed to
and borne by landowners. It also follows that the other half of the
tax must be paid from reduced expenditures on, and reduced consumption
of, the composite good (see expression (2)). Thus, the consumer-
renter, while enjoying the benefits of abatement, bears only half the
tax that finances it.
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For landlords whose properties are relatively close to the source,
the shifting effect serves at least partially to offset the benefits
gained from abatement itself and the clockwise rotation of the contour
that serves to raise their rents. For landlords with more distant
properties, the result of shifting is to compound the loss experienced
from abatement and the rotation-induced rent decline. The shifting
effect is in fact more severe for the latter group. For while each
consumer passes the same absolute amount of tax back to the landlord
in the form of lower rents, the more distant consumer, because he
faces higher land prices and consumes less land, passes back more on a
per acre basis. That is, for the more distant properties, shifting
brings a larger decline in rent per acre. This is shown in the right
panel of Figure 1 by the dashed contour n , which not only lies below
n
,
but has a shallower slope.
If marginal cost for the composite good is rising, rather than
constant, the leftward shift in demand in response to the income tax
will cause P to decline. Then the difference between aggregate
M
expenditures on rent before levy of the tax and aggregate expenditures
after levy of the tax is
A + 5(PM -PM )
(7e) P L - (P L) = =-i =-
L L
y A 2
where P^ is the before tax price of the composite good and P^9 the
after tax price, with P^, > PM„ . If 5=0, the outcome in the land
market is the same as in the case of constant marginal cost, with half
A
the tax, or — passed back to the landlord. If 6 > 0, more than half
the tax will be passed back, and if 5 < 0, less than half the tax will
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be passed back. The remainder of the tax comes from consumers, as
reflected in reduced purchases and consumption of M, and from the
suppliers of M, through reduced producers surplus.
There are thus three components to the outcome of this rising
marginal cost scenario: a "beneficiaries pay" component, in the form
of the burden borne by consumer-renters; a "polluters pay" component,
if we think of the suppliers of M as the polluting source; and an
"innocents pay" component in the burden passed back to the landlords
who, in the aggregate, gain no benefit from the abatement that is
being financed. One might not ordinarily expect the latter two com-
ponents to arise from an income tax on consumers. The more steeply
marginal costs rise, the smaller will be the fall in the consumption of
M and hence the loss to consumers, and the larger will be the burden on
producers.
B. The Effects of an Excise Tax
Again let us consider first the case of constant marginal cost in
the supply of the composite good. With an excise (but no income) tax,
price will rise by the amount of the tax. The difference between the
consumer's aggregate outlays on rent before levy of the tax and his
aggregate outlays after levy of the tax is given by (7e) with A = 0,
or
(7f ) P
l
L - (P
L
L)
T
-
ipi-
where now P^ < P^ . If 5=0, the consumer spends the same amount
for rent after the tax as before. The implication of this Cobb-
Douglas case is that none of the tax burden is passed through to the
-15-
landlord. From (7), 6=0 implies also unitary elasticity of demand
for M. Expenditures on M gross of the excise are the same as outlays
before the levy. After-tax outlays thus decline, along with the quan-
tity of M taken, and in this way consumer-renters bear the whole of
tax burden.
If 5 > 0, the amount spent by the consumer on rent rises following
the excise levy, and landlords benefit from the tax. Land and the
composite good are in this case substitutes. In the right panel of
Figure 1, the rent contour would shift from n —the post-abatement
pre-tax contour to n, • At tne same time gross outlays on M fall,4
implying elastic demand for the composite good (see expression (7)).
The consumer ends up paying the full amount of the tax, acquires less
of the composite good, and pays more rent. If 6 < 0, rent payments
decline, and part of the tax burden is thus passed through to
landlords. At the same time, gross outlays on M rise—the case of
relatively inelastic demand—with the remainder of the tax burden
borne by consumers through reduced consumption of M. Note that a
lower tax rate will suffice in this case to raise a given amount of
revenue than when 6 > 0, since with inelastic demand purchases of M
decline by less.
The conclusions are essentially unchanged when the composite good
is produced under conditions of increasing cost. Now, however, a part
of the tax burden will be borne by suppliers through a reduction in
producers surplus. Also, P will rise by less, given the amount of
the excise, than in the constant cost case. One implication of this
is that the impact on landlords, whether favorable or unfavorable,
-16-
will be reduced. Another is that a smaller excise will be needed than
in the constant cost case to raise a given amount of revenue, since
sales of the composite good will decline by less.
Under restricted conditions, this analysis of the effects of an
excise tax applies also to an emissions tax. The restrictions are
first that emissions be proportional to output of the composite good,
second that the increment of amenity improvement arising from the tax-
induced reduction in output be considered as already reflected in the
rotation of the bid-rent contour, and third that the tax not induce
the suppliers of M to undertake yet further abatement actions. But
even when these restrictions do not fully hold, the analysis still
serves to indicate the general direction of the expected effects.
What it mainly neglects are the potential emissions-reducing responses
by suppliers in an effort to minimize their taxes. To the extent that
such responses are successful, marginal costs will rise by less than
would otherwise occur.
To summarize briefly, with an income tax, a share of the resulting
burden will always be passed through to landlords. The remainder of
the burden will be borne by renter-consumers through their purchases
of the composite good, or with rising marginal costs it will be shared
with producers of that good. With an excise tax on the composite
good, landlords may benefit, be injured or be unaffected. The
remaining burden of the tax will be carried by consumer-renters or,
with rising marginal costs, it will be shared with producers of the
composite good. Meanwhile, on the environmental side, consumers are
-17-
beneficiaries of the abatement that taxes finance. In contrast, the
outcome for landlords is mixed since, apart from the shifting effects,
abatement induces a rise in rents for properties located toward the
source and a decline for those further out.
C. Other Kinds of Taxes
Two other types of taxes, if imposed, would cause the entire tax
burden to be carried by landlords. One is a simple property tax. The
levy of such a tax would not affect the supply of land and hence would
not alter the equilibrium bid-rent contour. Thus net rents would
simply decline to the detriment of landlords. A tax on gross rentals
would produce a similar result. The equilibrium set of bid-rents
would not be affected. Rather renters would now find themselves
making a part of their rent payment to the government and the
remainder to landlords. In neither of these cases would there be any
effects on the price of the composite good or the quantity taken of
.
8
it.
V. The Optimal Amount of Abatement
There are multiple vantage points from which to consider the
question, how much abatement, or improvement in the amenity level,
should be chosen? One such vantage point is simple utility maximiza-
tion for the consumer, given both the benefits from amenity improve-
ment and the behavior of prices, including their response to any taxes
9
that might be levied. Let us refer to this approach as the full
equilibrium approach and consider the outcomes when an income tax, and
alternately an excise tax, are levied. We shall assume throughout
-18-
that the composite good is supplied under conditions of constant
marginal cost.
Let the cost of achieving any amenity level be given by the
function,
(8) j = j Q + vW
where,
j = the amenity level at the disamenity source
i_ = the amenity level at the source in the absence of abatement
outlays
v = a parameter denoting environmental improvement per dollar of
abatement outlays
W = dollar outlays on abatement
If an income tax is contemplated, W/N will be the capitation charge,
or charge per consumer necessary to cover any expenditures on abate-
ment. Expression (4f), which gives the equilibrium utility level, may
now be rewritten to incorporate both abatement costs and the associated
capitation charge:
(7
-T7 + PM <S)[2X(j +vW)+gX
2
]
(8a) U « — 4P NM
Differentiating this expression with respect to W, setting the result
equal to zero and solving for W yields:
2vN(y+P <5)-(2j +gX)
(8b) W = -,4v
With W determined, j and hence Z are also determined.
-19-
This solution is utility-maximizing for every consumer, since each
consumer is located on the same utility-equalizing rent contour. It
is also a solution that recognizes the consumer's opportunity to shift
a part of the tax burden to the landowner and hence one that does not
recognize abatement's full cost. It is tempting to conclude that if
rents were internalized, say through an arrangement in which consumers
collectively owned the land and shared the rent proceeds, the utility-
maximizing level of abatement would be lower. But the conclusion
would be incorrect. With rent sharing, the consumer's cost of abate-
ment would rise. But so also would his income, and with it his demand
for abatement. In the model employed here, the two forces are off-
setting, and the utility-maximizing level of abatement outlays does
not change.
Suppose that instead of an income tax, abatement is to be paid for
by an excise tax on the composite good. To avoid mathematical compli-
cations, we consider here only the case where 6=0. Expression (4f)
may now be written,
(3c) U-Hl§fl
M
With an excise, P will rise by the amount of the tax. The per unit
W
tax needed to recover expenditures on abatement of W is T7-7, and the
new price P
, in relation to the old price P.. may be expressed as
(80) fM 2 = PM1+i^
From expression (2), the demand for M, we have
(8e) M- =
-20-
7
2 2PM2
Substituting (8e) into (8d) and simplifying gives
NyPMx
(8f)
*«2-W=2»
The last expression indicates the post-tax price of M when that good
is being sold in its equilibrium quantity. It may be substituted,
along with expression (8), into (8c) above (letting P =P>.j„) and
utility maximized as before to get
vNy - (2j +gX)
(88) W= 2-
Comparing this expression with (8b) (with <5 = 0), it is clear that
the consumer chooses lower abatement expenditures when he is to pay
for them through a goods tax rather than an income tax. A plausible
explanation for this outcome is that the excise tax carries an excess
burden. But that has not been demonstrated.
A second vantage point from which to consider the question of op-
timal outlays for abatement is that of cost-benefit analysis. Cost-
benefit methods comprise a potpourri of tools and techniques, but
within our problem context common elements would include the effort to
determine consumers' collective marginal willingness to pay for environ-
mental improvement, an assessment of the costs of such improvement,
and through the equating of marginal costs to marginal willingness to
pay, the choice of an optimal level of outlays.
The consumer's marginal willingness to pay for environmental
improvement— call it his MWTPZ— is defined as his marginal rate of
-21-
substitution between Z and his income, y. (See, e.g., Diamond and
Tolley, 1982, pp. 12-13.) This can be derived directly from the util-
ity function, as expressed in (1), and the demand functions (2) and
(2a).
y + P 6
(8j) MWTPZ = 2Z
M
This function expresses the implicit demand for Z and tells us Z 's
implicit price, P . Substituting for Z, we may write for any consumer
at any location X
y + P &
This equation tells us the consumer's marginal willingness to pay for
environmental improvement in terms of the amenity level at the source,
j . To obtain aggregate willingness to pay, one must sura over the
individual demand functions, such as (8k). This entails two steps.
First, the demand expression must be weighted by population density,
since density varies across the landspace with the changing price of
land. Second, the weighted demands at successive locations must be
12
added up. Performing these two steps yields the aggregate MWTPZ, or
*
P
,
for all consumers:
(8n) P
z
=
N(y+P
M
5)
(2j+gX)
Looking now at the cost side, we may rewrite (8) to get for
expenditures on or total cost of abatement,
j~j
(8o) W =
-22-
so that marginal cost— the cost of abatement that adds one unit to j
(and with a linear amenity function, to every other location), is
(8p) MC. = -
J v
*
Equating MC
. to P and solving for the optimal j yields
J «
vN(y+P 5) - ^x
(8q) j = 2
and substituting into (lOo) gives
vN(y+P 5) - (2j +gX)
(8r) W- SL_ 2
A direct comparison of the cost-benefit result in (8r) with the
earlier full-equilibrium utility-maximizing income tax case, as shown
by (8b), can now be made. The latter prescribes greater expenditures
on abatement than does the former. That the two should differ is
perhaps not surprising, for the cost-benefit procedure does not allow
for the equilibrating adjustments in a closed city that abatement sets
13in motion. It thus offers an incorrect prescription for consumer
o ptimization.
The cost-benefit approach, when applied in the closed-city
setting, is misleading in two related and noteworthy respects. First,
it implies that individual consumers at different locations will bene-
fit unequally from abatement, since they have different MWTPZ's. But
the equilibrium process is such that the opposite occurs. Each bene-
fits equally. Second, the approach implies that the collective or
aggregate benefit for consumers at any one location will be the same
as the collective benefit at any other location, since the aggregate
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MWTPZ 's are the same across locations. But the equilibrating process
brings about a different outcome. Aggregate benefits at locations
near to the source, where P is low and hence density is low, are
Lt
lower than aggregate benefits at more distant locations, where P
T
and
Li
density are high. Thus, representations that might be made to indi-
vidual consumers on the basis of cost-benefit findings, pursuant to a
proposed abatement action, would be falsified by the resulting
outcomes.
It should be added that the cost-benefit approach has nothing use-
ful to say to property owners, since their rents do not respond to
abatement in a manner consistent, from location to location, with con-
sumers' MWTPZ's.* Moreover, as noted earlier, abatement itself does
not bring any change in aggregate property values, while the charge
14
for abatement through an income tax reduces that value.
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Footnotes
*University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I am indebted to
Jan K. Brueckner for helpful counsel on many points.
The term "city" is intended in an analytically appropriate sense
A city as conventionally defined may be too heterogeneous an entity
for our purposes (Abelsen, 1979, pp. 12-13).
2
A more general form would be U = [(M+6)LZ]
,
where a > 0. All
the results obtained in the paper would hold also for this more
general form.
3
The effect of a change in source intensity on the rent contour
can be determined by evaluating expression (5) as follows:
(5a)
8P
L (y+pM 5)(gX
2
"2gXX)N
J (2jX+gX )
All terms on the right are positive except (gX^-2gx!T) . When X = 0,
the latter terra (and hence (5a)), is positive, and when X = Tit is
negative. Recalling that abatement entails an increase in j, this
implies clockwise rotation. The intersection of the pre- and post-
abatement contours occurs when the derivative is zero and hence where
gX
2
= 2gxY or X = j .
4
This is true notwithstanding that with a linear amenity function,
all consumers experience the same absolute increase in the amenity
index, Z.
Obviously in this situation the change (of zero) in aggregate
property value cannot serve as a measure of the benefits of abatement.
This result is consistent with the findings of others. (See, for
example, Polinsky and Shavell, 1976, Section 4, Pines and Weiss, 1976,
pp. 6-7, and Freeman, 1979, Ch . 6.) The result is not dependent on
the assumption of absentee landownership and would not be changed by
the internalization of rents.
This conclusion does not hold for an open city. The levy of a
tax temporarily reduces the utility of residents in the city. If the
city is open, out-migration will occur and with it, ultimately, a
change in land consumption by renters at all locations.
Starrett (1981) explores in a quite general framework the con-
ditions under which public good improvements and their tax-based
financing would be capitalized into land values. Using his ter-
minology, the tax cases presented in the present paper involve
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"internal capitalization," with rent changes occurring through the
"internal margin." See also Heurin (1981) who considers how, in an
open locale or city, land values respond to a public improvements
financed by an income tax.
Q
These results resemble what one might suspect in an open city
where consumers' utility levels are exogenous. See Polinsky and
Rubinfeld (1978). The complexity of their model allows for a variety
of interactions, so that a one-for-one translation of a property tax
into reduced land values does not occur.
9
In this approach, as elsewhere in the paper, rent payments are
treated as flowing to absentee landlords. A more global approach
would involve optimization on the assumption that rents stay within
the closed city and are shared by its consumers.
Internalization is accomplished by 1) multiplying expression (5)
by L to obtain the rent paid by any consumer, 2) recognizing that a
consumer's income includes as a component a share of aggregate rent,
3) aggregating over all consumers to obtain an expression for aggregate
rent, 4) solving for aggregate rent, and 5) incorporating the result
into expression (8a). Internalization yields an expression for con-
sumer utility equal to the right side of (8a) multiplied by 2.
Abatement is now more costly to consumers, since tax shifting reduces
their own incomes. At the same time, the interactive effects between
rent contour movements and income changes are offsetting with regard
to choice of an abatement level, and optimization yields the same
result as shown in (8b).
There is yet another vantage point—a variant on the utility
maximization procedure just discussed— from which to view the matter.
Consumers will not ordinarily be aware of how land rents might change
following abatement, or of how prices might change following the levy
of a tax. Such changes are, after all, the outcomes of economy-wide
forces that are difficult to perceive. Consumers are more likely to
believe that rents will be unaffected, or little affected, by abatement
actions and that any income or excise taxes that are levied will be
borne by them. It is of interest therefore to ask what level of abate-
ment consumers will choose, given their essential ignorance about how
market adjustment forces will operate. This situation can be explored
with the aid of expression (3), since it does not reflect the equili-
brating forces contained in (4f ) . Treating Pl as constant, making
appropriate substitutions, and optimizing on W yields the following
results for the consumer's optimal choice of abatement expenditures for
the respective cases of an income tax and (with <$ = 0) an excise tax:
vN(y+P 5) - 2(j +gX)
( 8h) W = 2_3v
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vNy - 2(j +gX)
(81 ) W- -
In contrast to the respective full equilibrium cases shown in (8b) and
(8g), the amount of abatement chosen by the consumer is now seen to
depend on his location, X. Those more remote from the source and
enjoying higher amenity levels will prefer lower values for W. This
outcome is conditioned by the fact that the consumer now does not
recognize either the rotation of the rent contour with abatement or the
tax-induced shifting of the contour. Also, the consumer will generally
choose less abatement when he fails to anticipate the market adjustment
process and treats P^ as constant.
12
Expression (4a) defines density. Substituting (2a), the con-
sumer's demand for land, into (4a), the expression for density, and
then (5), the equilibrium price of land into the result, yields popula-
tion density D at any location X:
( 8 A) D- 2!
(j+g
fj>
2 jX + gXZ
Multiplying (8k) by («*) gives
N(y+P 6)
(8m) D • P = "
(2jX+gO
This equation expresses the total of the MWPTZs for any location X.
An interesting feature of the expression is its independence of X.
That is, the total MWTPZ for any one location is the same as for any
other. By integrating (8m) with respect to X across the length of
the landspace, from X = to X X, we obtain expression (8n) in the
text.
13
These adjustments, as reflected in (8b), include the shifting
of a part of the income tax burden from renters to absentee land-
owners, and one might surmise that this factor contributes to the
disparity between the two outcomes. However, as discussed earlier,
the internalization of rents, with consumers sharing equally in the
aggregate of rent proceeds, does not alter the full-equilibrium
result
.
14
In an open city setting, the utility of renters is fixed by
multi-city or economy-wide forces (Polinsky and Shavell, 1976, p. 123),
and it is property owners who benefit from abatement through resultant
higher land prices. The cost-benefit approach fares better in this
-27-
setting in two basic ways. First, through reliance on the MWTPZ, it
accurately anticipates the effects of abatement on property values.
Second, as a corollary, its prescription for optimal abatement in any
city or locale corresponds to the abatement level that, maximizes pro-
perty values in that locale. Both of these points can be demonstrated
using an open city version of the model employed in this paper. These
issues have been treated by others using variant approaches. (E.g.,
Brueckner, 1983, Polinsky and Shavell, 1976, and Starrett, 1981.)
-28-
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